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National Suicide Prevention Week 2026: Connect Awareness to Respectful Access and Follow-Through

National Suicide Prevention Week 2026 executive healthcare observance hero.
Greg Wahlstrom, MBA, HCM
National Suicide Prevention Week 2026 executive healthcare observance hero.

September 6-12, 2026 · Executive Brief

National Suicide Prevention Week 2026: Connect Awareness to Respectful Access and Follow-Through

Treat every awareness message as an operational promise: a person can find a private route, reach a qualified response, retain meaningful choice, and remain connected across transitions.

Leadership signal

Move from a visible campaign to a dependable way into help

National Suicide Prevention Week is observed September 6-12, 2026. The week creates an important public opening, but a communication campaign is not the same as a reliable support system. A message can encourage connection while the actual route remains difficult to find, exposed, delayed, fragmented, or dependent on a person repeating painful information. Healthcare executives own the gap between what the message promises and what the operating system can deliver.

The executive aim is not to turn managers into clinicians. It is to make qualified care easier to reach and safer to navigate. That means public information that matches current capacity, entry channels that protect privacy, staff who know their role, escalation that follows approved procedures, handoffs that are acknowledged, and follow-up that does not disappear when responsibility crosses a boundary. The work must also account for people who prefer different channels, need language or disability access, worry about confidentiality, have had harmful prior encounters, or face practical barriers to returning.

Evidence supports a systems view. Youth suicidality in primary care has been described as a shared, whole-system responsibility rather than an isolated episode.1 Reviews of emergency care identify recurring components such as follow-up, family involvement when appropriate, psychoeducation, and safety planning, while also warning that small studies and heterogeneity limit certainty.2 These findings do not prescribe one universal workflow. They do show why access, assessment, planning, transitions, and ongoing connection should be designed as one accountable route.

Original abstract vector illustration showing an awareness message connecting through a private doorway to qualified support and a visible follow-through path.
Original non-AI editorial illustration. The uninterrupted line represents the management responsibility to connect public communication with a private, accepted, and visible route to support.

Evidence to action

Use the evidence with precision, humility, and operational discipline

No single study proves that one local workflow will work for every setting or population. The portfolio behind this brief includes implementation trials, observational cohorts, systematic and scoping reviews, qualitative studies, and co-produced frameworks. Together, they support a practical direction: pair a structured response with follow-up, tailor the encounter, protect choice, and study implementation conditions. They also require clear caveats about age, setting, design, sample size, and the difference between an intervention component and a complete system of care.

In 19 primary care practices, implementation support for suicide care was associated with more safety planning and a reduction in documented attempts within 90 days from 6.0 to 4.5 per 10,000 visits. The authors reported this as a 25 percent reduction in the secondary analysis.8 The absolute event rates are small, and the result comes from a stepped-wedge, cluster-randomized implementation trial. Leaders should preserve both facts. The study supports integrated primary care processes, but it is not a universal performance benchmark.

Figure 1. Primary care implementation signals

Two paired horizontal bar comparisons from a 19-practice primary care implementation trial: safety planning increased from 32.8 to 38.3 per 10,000 visits, and suicide attempts within 90 days decreased from 6.0 to 4.5 per 10,000 visits.
Absolute visit rates from a secondary analysis of a stepped-wedge, cluster-randomized implementation trial across 19 primary care practices. The values describe that study, not a target for another organization.8

A large emergency department cohort compared the Safety Planning Intervention with structured follow-up, called SPI+, against usual care. Over six months, suicidal behavior occurred in 3.03 percent of the intervention group and 5.29 percent of the comparison group, described as 45 percent fewer behaviors. The intervention group also had greater odds of attending at least one outpatient mental health visit.9 This was not a randomized trial, and the cohort came from Veterans Health Administration emergency departments. It is useful evidence for combining a plan with follow-up, not proof that the same effect will transfer unchanged to every population.

Figure 2. Structured follow-up in an adult emergency department cohort

Bar chart showing suicidal behavior over six months at 5.29 percent with usual care and 3.03 percent with safety planning plus structured follow-up in a Veterans Health Administration emergency department cohort.
Observed six-month rates in a nonrandomized adult cohort. SPI+ combined safety planning with structured telephone follow-up. The 45 percent relative difference should be read alongside the absolute rates, design, and VHA setting.9

Component, not endpoint

A 2025 meta-analysis of stand-alone safety planning for children and adolescents found no significant effect on suicide-related outcomes and rated study bias as moderate to high.17 Leaders should never reduce pediatric suicide prevention to completion of a form.

Promising, still bounded

An emergency department scoping review found promising signals for crisis response planning and ketamine, but included studies were few and generally small, with an average sample of 57.16 Qualified clinical governance must separate emerging evidence from standard operating claims.

Implementation is part of efficacy

A digital safety-plan study associated activation with a 50 percent lower likelihood of returning to the emergency department after an initial attempt, but the quasi-experimental design cannot establish the same causal effect in every setting.6 Technology should strengthen access, not become a new gate.

Accountable access route

Make every request visible until a qualified receiver accepts responsibility

A dependable route starts before an appointment. It begins when a person, family member, clinician, colleague, or community partner tries to identify a next step. The route should not require diagnostic language, perfect disclosure, or insider knowledge. Public and staff-facing instructions should offer clear options, explain privacy in plain language, distinguish routine from urgent pathways, and state what happens after contact. When a route is temporarily unavailable, the message should name a safe alternative rather than send the person into a dead end.

The first response is an operational moment. Staff need a role-appropriate script, a private channel, and a defined way to reach qualified assessment. They should not make promises the organization cannot keep, infer risk from appearance, or turn uncertainty into an unsupported transfer. The management design should let the current owner see whether the request was acknowledged, when the next step is due, and what approved escalation applies if acceptance does not occur.

A route should preserve choice whenever circumstances allow. A qualitative study of suicide-related tele-mental health evaluations in emergency departments found that transparency and choice were central to patient and clinician experience.4 Leaders should therefore define what people are told before a remote evaluation, what privacy conditions are available, how they can express concerns, what alternatives exist, and how the next owner receives the result. Telehealth can extend access, but it should not obscure who is responsible in the room or after the connection ends.

Figure 3. Proposed request-to-follow-through process

Process flow from clear request channel to private acknowledgment, qualified assessment, agreed next step, accepted handoff, and follow-up, with a visible exception queue for delay, declined route, or changed need.
This original management flow is not a clinical protocol. Local clinical leaders define assessment and care. Operations leaders make ownership, acceptance, privacy, exceptions, and re-entry visible.

Respectful encounter

Protect dignity, personalization, and choice throughout the encounter

Standardization should make support more reliable, not make the encounter impersonal. A co-produced adult safety-planning framework emphasized personalization and the process through which the plan is developed.10 Emergency department qualitative research likewise identified practical implementation needs, including collaborative use, preparation, and integration into workflow.5 These studies support a clear management principle: audit the quality of the interaction and system support, not only whether a document exists.

For executives, respectful care can be translated into observable operating conditions. Is there a private setting? Does the person know the role of each participant? Are options and limits explained in understandable language? Can interpreters and accommodations be reached without avoidable delay? Is family involvement invited or limited according to the person’s preferences, legal requirements, age, and clinical judgment? Does documentation distinguish the person’s voice from the team’s interpretation? Are remote encounters designed so privacy and technical problems can be surfaced safely?

Staff views matter because implementation fails when a process feels unusable or disconnected from care. In a study of 50 key informants, almost all viewed an emergency department safety-planning and structured follow-up intervention as helpful, while only a slight majority believed it improved safety.11 That difference is instructive. Acceptability is necessary, but confidence in impact also depends on training, resources, clinical integration, and whether follow-up actually occurs.

A therapeutic model for adolescents presenting after self-harm combines assessment, safety planning, and solution-focused brief therapy, including support for carers.3 It illustrates why leaders should fund a complete service model rather than extract one task from a broader intervention. The relevant management questions concern credentialing, supervision, continuity, capacity, fidelity, and the experience of young people and carers. Clinical leaders determine appropriateness for an individual.

Original abstract vector illustration of a respectful support encounter with equal seating, a privacy boundary, clearly offered choices, and a shared next-step card.
Original non-AI editorial illustration. Equal visual weight, a protected space, and multiple offered routes represent respect, transparency, and meaningful choice.

Workforce and equity

Design a system that supports the people seeking help and the workforce responding

Healthcare workers can face substantial distress while also worrying about confidentiality, professional consequences, or burdening colleagues. A long-running healthcare-worker outreach and screening program reported 5,368 screenings. Among respondents, 39.9 percent reported depressive symptoms, 53.9 percent burnout, and 10 percent suicidal ideation; 941 new referrals were made.7 The program was not a population-prevalence survey, and voluntary screening can introduce selection effects. Still, it shows the scale of operational demand that a trusted route may reveal. Leaders should align outreach with confidential capacity, independent options where appropriate, staffing, and a clear separation between support and punitive processes.

Equity review must be specific. A national study of 3,015 Black adults and 527 American Indian or Alaska Native adults reported that 13.1 percent and 18.4 percent, respectively, had been screened for firearm access.13 Those values are not universal benchmarks and should not be detached from the study’s design or populations. The management implication is to examine whether screening practices are clinically appropriate, consistent, respectful, and free from racialized assumptions. Organizations should review variation with protected methods, community input, and clinical governance rather than use a single aggregate rate as proof of quality.

Adaptation work for a universal pediatric primary care strategy used input from 337 parents and nine expert stakeholders, highlighting autonomy, context, and privacy in discussions of firearm access.14 This supports a careful approach to sensitive safety conversations. The organization should define who is qualified to ask, how the purpose is explained, where the discussion occurs, what choices are offered, how responses are documented, and what services or resources are available. Executives should not turn a sensitive conversation into a blunt compliance target.

Trust

Test whether people believe the route is private, respectful, and separate from unnecessary employment, academic, legal, or administrative exposure. Correct the process that produces distrust rather than labeling reluctance as resistance.

Access

Review language, disability, digital, transportation, cost, schedule, cultural safety, rural access, and prior harmful experiences. Offer connected alternatives so channel choice does not break continuity.

Workforce support

Match responsibilities with protected time, training, supervision, consultation, escalation, emotional support, and workload monitoring. Do not rely on goodwill to compensate for missing system capacity.

Transitions and follow-through

Keep the person connected when time, team, or setting changes

Transitions are not administrative edges. They are part of the support experience. A person may move from primary care to behavioral health, from an emergency department to community care, from an inpatient setting to home, or from a workplace route to an independent service. Each move can introduce delay, repeated disclosure, conflicting advice, unclear responsibility, and a new privacy context. A reliable system makes the next owner and next expected action visible without creating a shadow clinical record in an operational queue.

Follow-up is not simply a reminder. It should be a defined, qualified, consent-aware process linked to the person’s circumstances and local policy. The SPI+ cohort suggests value in combining a collaborative plan with structured contact after emergency care.9 Primary care reviews also find only a small number of brief interventions across heterogeneous studies, reinforcing the need to avoid overclaiming and to monitor local implementation carefully.12

Parents bereaved by suicide described gaps across systems of care, including problems with access, communication, continuity, and support for families.15 Lived experience should therefore be part of governance, design, and review. Participation must be voluntary, compensated where appropriate, trauma-informed, and supported by clear boundaries. A listening session should lead to named actions and feedback, not extract stories without changing the system.

Original abstract vector illustration of primary care, emergency, community, digital, and workplace support routes joining an accountable handoff and follow-through loop.
Original non-AI editorial illustration. Multiple routes share one visible ownership line so people can change settings or channels without becoming unowned.

Failure modes

Investigate where the route becomes difficult, exposed, delayed, or unowned

Leaders should review failures as system signals. A missed contact may reflect an unsafe voicemail policy, an inaccessible portal, a work schedule, a transportation barrier, a language mismatch, a changed phone, fear of disclosure, or a handoff that was never accepted. A repeated emergency visit may reflect changing clinical need, unavailable follow-up, or many other conditions. Counts can reveal where to ask questions, but they do not explain a person’s motives or establish cause.

The pediatric emergency evidence base repeatedly points to small samples and heterogeneous interventions.2 Qualitative implementation studies add detail about workflow, clinician preparation, collaboration, and patient experience.5 Use both forms of evidence. Quantitative signals can identify variation. Direct listening can explain conditions that the data do not capture. Neither should be used to judge an individual.

Figure 4. Qualitative map of route failure modes

Fishbone diagram organizing possible suicide prevention route failures under access and clarity, privacy and trust, workforce and capacity, transitions and ownership, choice and family involvement, and equity and practical barriers.
This original fishbone is a listening and process-review aid. The branches are not ranked, mutually exclusive, or causal estimates. Validate locally with people using and operating the route.

Operating system

Build one governed route across communication, clinical care, and community connection

Public communication, clinical services, human resources, emergency care, primary care, digital health, community partnerships, privacy, risk, and quality teams may all touch the route. Without a shared operating model, each group can optimize its segment while the person experiences the gaps. Governance should define scope, accountable leadership, clinical authority, privacy and data boundaries, partner responsibilities, measures, review cadence, and the process for addressing urgent and unresolved exceptions.

Keep operational visibility separate from clinical documentation. An improvement queue may show that a request is awaiting acknowledgment, an interpreter was unavailable, or a referral destination could not accept the handoff. It should not duplicate sensitive clinical details. Access to operational data should be role-based, minimal, time-limited where appropriate, and reviewed with privacy and security leaders. Small groups and protected characteristics require suppression and careful interpretation.

Community organizations should be treated as partners, not overflow capacity. Agreements should address current scope, hours, eligibility, communication, acknowledgment, privacy, escalation, language access, compensation where applicable, and what happens when demand exceeds capacity. Public messages should be updated when partner availability changes. A resource list that is technically accurate but operationally stale can create false reassurance.

Communication governance belongs in the same operating model. Before publication, a designated clinical and operational reviewer should confirm that each statement is accurate, respectful, current, and connected to a real service. The review should cover websites, social posts, staff messages, signage, automated replies, referral directories, and partner materials. Owners should know how quickly to correct a closed route or capacity change. After the week, leaders should compare what people were told with what teams were able to provide, document gaps without exposing individuals, and update the message before the next campaign. This closed loop turns communication from a one-time product into a maintained service promise.

Governance

One executive sponsor, one operational owner, qualified clinical leadership, privacy and equity review, and a clear decision process for exceptions.

Service reliability

Verified entry points, current capacity, trained responders, acknowledged handoffs, locally approved escalation, and a route back in when circumstances change.

Learning

A small set of defined measures, protected experience feedback, regular exception review, documented action, and transparent limits on what the data can show.

Executive scorecard

Measure whether the route is usable, accepted, connected, and improving

Begin with operational definitions, not a dashboard. For each measure, specify the question, population, numerator, denominator where relevant, time window, data source, exclusions, owner, review cadence, equity safeguards, and limitations. Use run charts and direct experience together. Do not create quotas for sensitive conversations, infer clinical quality from a single process count, or compare small groups without appropriate protection.

Figure 5. Proposed executive scorecard

Candidate local measures and balancing checks. These are not external benchmarks.
Route domainCandidate measureOperational definition to set locallyExecutive questionBalancing or equity check
FindabilityVerified entry-point accuracyPublic and staff locations reviewed against current hours, eligibility, capacity, and urgent alternativesDoes every message lead to a route that currently exists?Language, disability, digital, rural, and after-hours access
AcknowledgmentRequests acknowledged within the locally defined windowEligible requests with confirmed receipt divided by eligible requests, stratified only when safeCan the current owner see whether contact was accepted?Wrong-channel burden, duplicate work, privacy incidents, workforce load
HandoffAccepted transitionsTransfers with a named receiver and acknowledgment before the sending role closes responsibilityWhere does ownership become unclear?Declined routes, unavailable capacity, repeat disclosure, partner burden
Follow-throughAgreed next action completed or re-plannedActions with documented completion or a person-centered alternative under local policyDoes the system respond when the first plan no longer fits?Unwanted contact, channel preference, unreachable status, changed needs
ExperienceRespect, privacy, clarity, and choice themesProtected feedback reviewed with qualitative context and an action ownerWhat do people say made connection easier or harder?Who is missing from feedback, and what participation burden was created?
ImprovementVerified corrective actionsAssigned changes tested, reviewed, and confirmed complete with remaining limits statedDid review produce a safer and more usable route?Workarounds, unintended access loss, inequitable effect, staff fatigue
Each organization should set definitions, safeguards, and review thresholds with clinical, operational, privacy, equity, and lived-experience input. None of these rows is a diagnosis, treatment recommendation, or national target.

90-day agenda

Use the observance to correct one verified barrier and stabilize the change

Days 1 to 30

Define and listen

Name the sponsor, clinical authority, operational owner, population, entry point, route boundaries, community partners, and urgent procedures. Verify every public message and resource. Map privacy, assessment, handoffs, follow-up, exceptions, and re-entry. Review recent route failures and listen to people using and operating the system. Select one barrier that can be responsibly addressed.

Days 31 to 60

Test and support

Co-design the change with affected people and teams. Define roles, training, supervision, privacy controls, acceptance signals, and escalation. Test in a limited setting with current capacity. Review exceptions at least weekly. Watch for delay, unwanted disclosure, repeated storytelling, access loss, partner burden, staff burden, and inequitable effects.

Days 61 to 90

Stabilize and decide

Review operational measures with experience feedback and clinical governance. Correct weak definitions and unsafe workarounds. Confirm that messages still match capacity. Decide what to adopt, adapt, stop, or study. Report what changed, what remains uncertain, who owns unresolved dependencies, and when leaders will verify sustained performance.

The sequence is an improvement framework, not a clinical timeline. Urgent response follows approved procedures at all times. The organization should pause or modify the pilot if it creates privacy risk, reduces access, overburdens a partner, produces unsafe workarounds, or exceeds available qualified capacity.

Figure 6. Proposed 90-day implementation timeline

Gantt-style 90-day timeline showing governance, lived-experience listening, route mapping, privacy and equity review, staff preparation, limited testing, weekly exception review, measurement, improvement cycles, and a day-90 decision across three phases.
This original timeline is a management sequence, not a clinical guideline. Approved emergency response, clinical governance, privacy, equity review, and visible exception management continue across all phases.

Leadership close

Make awareness credible through respectful access and accountable follow-through

National Suicide Prevention Week can make it easier to speak about support and connection. The executive responsibility is to ensure that the organization is ready for what the message invites. A trusted route is clear before contact, private during the encounter, qualified at assessment, collaborative in planning, acknowledged at handoff, responsive when circumstances change, and visible until the next action is complete or responsibly re-planned.

The evidence supports structured approaches and follow-up, but it does not support a compliance-only response. Reviews show heterogeneity and small studies. Cohort findings require design and setting caveats. Youth evidence warns against presenting stand-alone safety planning as sufficient.17 Strong leadership keeps those limits visible while still improving the operating conditions around qualified care.

Use the week to verify every message, listen without extraction, correct one barrier, and establish ownership that continues after September 12. The measure of leadership is not the number of campaign impressions. It is whether people can find a respectful next step, whether the next team accepts responsibility, and whether the organization learns when the route does not work as intended.

Peer-reviewed evidence portfolio

References

  1. Henderson, M. D., Batchelder, A., Rodney, T., & Ling, C. (2026). Chronicity of suicidality: Youth suicide prevention in primary care. Journal of Psychosocial Nursing & Mental Health Services, 64(1), 24-30. https://doi.org/10.3928/02793695-20250611-02
  2. Radunz, M., Johnson, C., O’Dea, B., & Wade, T. D. (2025). Interventions for self-harm and suicidality in paediatric emergency departments: A meta-review. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 34(9), 2649-2658. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00787-025-02706-9
  3. McCabe, R., O’Keeffe, S., & Long, M. (2026). The “Supporting Adolescents with Self Harm” (SASH) intervention supporting young people (and carers) presenting to the emergency department with self-harm: Therapeutic assessment, safety planning, and solution-focused brief therapy. Healthcare, 14(2), 168. https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare14020168
  4. Khanna, A., Larkin, C., Davis-Martin, R., Micklus, I. K., Sefair, A. V., Roy, A., Klaucke, C. G., Reznek, M. A., & Boudreaux, E. D. (2025). Patient and health care provider experiences with suicide-related tele-mental health evaluations in the emergency department: Multiphase qualitative study. JMIR Mental Health, 12, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.2196/72541
  5. Brousseau-Paradis, C., Genest, C., Maltais, N., Séguin, M., & Rassy, J. (2025). Towards a better use of safety planning in emergency departments: An exploratory study of patients and clinicians’ perspectives. Community Mental Health Journal, 61(4), 724-733. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10597-024-01394-0
  6. Barrigón, M. L., Schmidt, C., Elices, M., Porras-Segovia, A., De Granda-Beltrán, A. M., Artés-Rodríguez, A., Courtet, P., Pérez-Sola, V., & Baca-García, E. (2025). Impact of digital safety plan activation on subsequent emergency departments visits following an initial suicide attempt: Quasi-experimental study. JMIR Mental Health, 12, e70253. https://doi.org/10.2196/70253
  7. Zisook, S., Doran, N., Moutier, C., Shapiro, D., Downs, N., Sanchez, C., Accardi, R., & Davidson, J. (2024). Supporting healthcare workers well-being and suicide prevention: The HEAR program May 2009-April 2023. Journal of Medical Regulation, 110(3), 18-32. https://doi.org/10.30770/2572-1852-110.3.18
  8. Angerhofer Richards, J., Cruz, M., Stewart, C., Lee, A. K., Ryan, T. C., Ahmedani, B. K., & Simon, G. E. (2024). Effectiveness of integrating suicide care in primary care: Secondary analysis of a stepped-wedge, cluster randomized implementation trial. Annals of Internal Medicine, 177(11), 1471-1481. https://doi.org/10.7326/M24-0024
  9. Stanley, B., Brown, G. K., Brenner, L. A., Galfalvy, H. C., Currier, G. W., Knox, K. L., Chaudhury, S. R., Bush, A. L., & Green, K. L. (2018). Comparison of the Safety Planning Intervention with follow-up vs usual care of suicidal patients treated in the emergency department. JAMA Psychiatry, 75(9), 894-900. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2018.1776
  10. McGleenan, K., Gordon, I., Smith, H., Barker, J., Lilley, R., Scott, T., Mart, P., Walker, V., Clibbens, N., Taylor, J., Fishburn, S., Ramtohul, A., Nwokoroku, S. C., & Flynn, D. (2025). Developing a co-produced practice framework to support personalised safety planning for adults experiencing suicidality. Health Expectations, 28(5), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.70423
  11. Chesin, M. S., Stanley, B., Haigh, E. A. P., Chaudhury, S. R., Pontoski, K., Knox, K. L., & Brown, G. K. (2017). Staff views of an emergency department intervention using safety planning and structured follow-up with suicidal veterans. Archives of Suicide Research, 21(1), 127-137. https://doi.org/10.1080/13811118.2016.1164642
  12. Younesi, P., Haas, C., Dreischulte, T., Schmitt, A., Gensichen, J., & Lukaschek, K. (2025). Brief interventions for suicidal ideation in primary care: A systematic review. BMC Primary Care, 26(1), 167. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12875-025-02848-4
  13. Bond, A. E., Rodriguez, T. R., Goldman, G., Moceri-Brooks, J., Semenza, D. C., & Anestis, M. D. (2026). Frequency of Black and American Indian/Alaskan Native US residents screened for firearm access. Journal of Racial & Ethnic Health Disparities, 13(2), 1299-1306. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40615-025-02334-8
  14. Davis, M., Johnson, C., Pettit, A. R., Barkin, S., Hoffman, B. D., Jager-Hyman, S., King, C. A., Lieberman, A., Massey, L., Rivara, F. P., Sigel, E., Walton, M., Wolk, C. B., & Beidas, R. S. (2021). Adapting Safety Check as a universal suicide prevention strategy in pediatric primary care. Academic Pediatrics, 21(7), 1161-1170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.acap.2021.04.012
  15. Kourgiantakis, T., Cooper, D., Cooper, D., Craig, S., Lee, E., Jones, J., Lau, C. K. Y., Tousignant, R.-N., Singer, J. B., Johnstone, M., & Zaheer, J. (2025). Suicide among youth and young adults in Canada: Bereaved parents’ perspectives on the systems of care. International Journal of Mental Health Systems, 19(1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13033-025-00680-y
  16. Hood, A. P., Tibbits, L. M., Laporta, J. I., Carrillo, J., Adams, L. R., Young-McCaughan, S., Peterson, A. L., & De Lorenzo, R. A. (2024). Recent interventions for acute suicidality delivered in the emergency department: A scoping review. Western Journal of Emergency Medicine, 25(6), 858-868. https://doi.org/10.5811/westjem.18640
  17. Albaum, C., Irwin, S. H., Muha, J., Schumacher, A., Clarissa, S., Finkelstein, Y., Bridge, J. A., & Korczak, D. J. (2025). Safety planning interventions for suicide prevention in children and adolescents: A systematic review and meta-analysis. JAMA Pediatrics, 179(8), 886-895. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2025.1012

Scope note: This executive brief supports healthcare management, access, quality improvement, workforce support, governance, and community partnership. It does not provide personal medical advice, establish a diagnosis, prescribe treatment, or replace emergency procedures. Qualified clinicians should use current evidence, individual information, consent, shared decisions, and local policy.

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