Stalking Awareness Month · January 1–31, 2026
Build a clear, private, and accountable support route
Stalking often becomes visible as a pattern rather than one unmistakable event. Healthcare leaders can make recognition safer by connecting private access, informed choice, careful documentation, trained response, accepted handoffs, and follow-up that does not increase risk.
Safety and scope note. This brief addresses organizational design. It does not diagnose stalking, assess an individual’s danger, provide a universal safety plan, instruct someone to confront or investigate another person, or replace qualified clinical, advocacy, security, privacy, legal, human-resources, campus, or law-enforcement judgment. Laws, reporting duties, confidentiality rules, available remedies, and safe documentation practices vary by setting and jurisdiction. A person’s preferred action may also change as circumstances change. Organizations should make individualized support from trained professionals available and explain privacy limits before collecting sensitive information whenever possible.
The executive accountability case
Make awareness an operating test
January 2026 is the twenty-second National Stalking Awareness Month, according to the Stalking Prevention, Awareness, and Resource Center. The national observance asks communities to recognize stalking as a pattern and to strengthen informed response. For a healthcare organization, that means more than publishing a definition or adding a resource link. It means asking whether a patient, employee, clinician, student, volunteer, or visitor can reach a private route, describe a pattern without being dismissed, understand what will happen to the information, choose among realistic supports, and know who remains responsible after a referral.
Stalking can include repeated unwanted contact, surveillance, threats, showing up, property interference, technology-facilitated conduct, impersonation, or contact through other people. The behavior, context, relationship, impact, frequency, and escalation matter. A 2026 systematic review of 80 highly relevant cyberstalking studies found that repeated contact by email, social media, and text appeared often, alongside account access, location tracking, impersonation, and contact with family or friends.1 The review also documented substantial heterogeneity. It should not be converted into a checklist that automatically labels a person, a single event, or a particular diagnosis.
Healthcare leaders have several responsibilities at once. They must protect a person’s voice and privacy; prepare staff to respond without blame or overpromising; separate immediate safety decisions from longer-term support; preserve useful information without creating new exposure; coordinate clinical, behavioral-health, advocacy, workplace, campus, security, privacy, and legal functions; and learn from failed handoffs. None of those duties requires a staff member to become an investigator. They require a defined system.
The executive priority is therefore simple to state and demanding to operate: establish one consent-aware route with a named owner, a trained backup, current local resources, a method for urgent consultation, and verification that an accepted handoff occurred. A referral sent is not a connection completed. A policy posted is not a workforce prepared. An awareness campaign launched without a safe response route may invite disclosure that the organization cannot reliably support.
Leadership signal. Before amplifying January messaging, run one end-to-end simulation that begins with a person asking for help in a real access point and ends only after the receiving support has accepted the handoff and a safe follow-up method has been confirmed.
Pattern recognition and technology
See repetition, context, and impact without turning staff into detectives
A single incident may appear ambiguous when viewed alone. A system that stores each contact in a different place can unintentionally hide repetition. An emergency department sees anxiety. A manager sees repeated unwanted visits. A campus office sees impersonation online. A privacy team sees an account-access concern. A clinician sees sleep disruption. Each observation may be incomplete, and combining information without consent or authority may create its own risk. The goal is not unrestricted data sharing. It is a governed route for recognizing when separate signals may require expert review.
Technology-facilitated abuse expands the number of channels through which unwanted conduct can occur, but it does not make every upsetting online exchange stalking. The 2026 cyberstalking review describes varied behaviors, motivations, samples, and definitions and cautions against assuming that offline risk tools transfer directly to online contexts.1 A 2025 United States study of technology-facilitated abuse among young adults found financial and healthcare consequences, including counseling, medication, technology, housing, and fraud-related costs.6 Technology-facilitated abuse is broader than stalking, so those cost estimates are not stalking-specific. They still show why digital experiences can carry operational consequences for access, recovery, attendance, housing, and continuity.
Fear and the work required to stay safe can constrain participation even when exposure counts alone look similar. In a nationally representative 2026 survey of 1,992 United Kingdom adults, women reported greater fear, negative impact, and safety work related to online harms, and contact-based harms such as cyberstalking were more often directed at women. In one specific participation outcome, 23 percent of women and 40 percent of men said they were comfortable expressing political views online.4 The comparison is not a stalking prevalence estimate and cannot establish cause. It illustrates why leaders should assess burden and participation, not only incident counts.
Figure 1 · Evidence chart
Comfort expressing political views online in one 2026 UK adult survey
Scale: 0 to 40 percent. Sample: n = 1,992 UK adults. Percentages are survey estimates for this single outcome.
| Respondent group | Comfortable expressing political views online |
|---|---|
| Women | 23% |
| Men | 40% |
Organizations need a plain-language recognition standard that avoids both extremes: minimizing a concerning pattern and labeling uncertain conduct as proven stalking. Staff should know how to listen for repetition, unwantedness, fear or substantial distress, threats, proximity, technology involvement, relationship context, and escalation. They should document the person’s own words when appropriate, distinguish observation from inference, and consult the designated expert route. They should not test a suspected perpetrator, access a device without authority, promise secrecy they cannot provide, or pressure a person to gather more evidence.
Digital safety requires specialized, individualized support. A 2026 participatory study with young adults living with HIV and key populations in Kenya found that technology-facilitated abuse intersected with privacy, disclosure, help seeking, and social vulnerability.2 The setting is specific and the findings should not be generalized as prevalence estimates. The design lesson is broader: build privacy and response with the people most affected, because an apparently convenient communication channel may be unsafe or inaccessible for someone else.
Private access and disclosure
Create a route that does not require the perfect label or perfect report
People may not use the word stalking. They may describe repeated messages, a person appearing at appointments, account interference, fear about an employee entrance, a former partner contacting colleagues, or a pattern that feels difficult to explain. They may not be ready to contact police, involve an employer, change a care setting, or adopt an identity such as victim or survivor. A reliable response does not make a label the price of support.
A 2026 analysis of the National Crime Victimization Survey’s Supplemental Victimization Survey identified four latent classes of rationales for not reporting: denial of the stalker’s intent, rejection of a victim identity, lack of a stated rationale, and denial of serious harm.5 These modeled categories are not universal explanations. They show why a single prompt such as “Do you want to report this?” is too narrow. A 2024 statewide survey of 1,284 adult women with stalking, sexual-assault, or intimate-partner-violence experiences found that labeling the experience or oneself was associated with perceptions of service need and talking to police.10 Because the sample combined victimization types and was limited to one state, the study should not be used to pressure people toward a label.
Nonreporting can also be shaped by anticipated disbelief, fear of worsening the situation, embarrassment, and gendered expectations. A 2024 exploratory text-mining study of Japanese adults who described former-partner stalking examined these themes among 253 men and 321 women who had not sought help.12 The study is context-specific and hypothesis-generating. Research on engagement with civil and criminal legal systems likewise associates formal help-seeking with repeated conduct, relationship context, fear, and prior victim-service access rather than one simple decision rule.11 These studies support a practical rule: make help available before a person can produce a complete chronology, prove intent, or choose a formal system.
Private access must be designed across the actual environment. A patient may arrive with another person. An employee may fear that a manager will be notified automatically. A student may be unsure whether campus policy triggers a process. A clinician may need support involving both workplace safety and professional licensing boundaries. Portal messages, appointment reminders, printed after-visit summaries, billing communication, call logs, visitor systems, and shared devices may reveal information. The organization should map these channels with privacy, clinical, advocacy, security, digital, human-resources, legal, and patient or workforce representatives.
Figure 2 · Proposed process flow
A consent-aware route from first contact to verified follow-up
- Private accessOffer a safe opportunity to speak and check whether the channel itself is safe.
- Immediate safetyUse the approved urgent-consultation and emergency route when danger may be immediate.
- Privacy boundaryExplain confidentiality, documentation, information-sharing, and reporting limits before details when possible.
- Pattern accountListen to the person’s words, distinguish fact from inference, and avoid investigative promises.
- Trained reviewReach the designated advocate or qualified risk-review function under local policy.
- Options and choiceOffer realistic clinical, advocacy, workplace, campus, security, legal, or community supports.
- Accepted handoffConfirm the receiving service has accepted the connection and knows the agreed information boundary.
- Safe follow-upAgree on channel, timing, wording, owner, escalation, and how the plan will be reviewed.
Every entry point needs a short response standard. Thank the person for sharing. State that the behavior is not their fault. Ask what would increase or decrease safety. Explain what the staff member can and cannot keep private. Avoid contacting the other person or making an external referral without understanding authority, urgency, and the individual’s wishes. If the staff member does not know what to do, the system should provide real-time consultation instead of leaving the person to restart elsewhere.
Health, recovery, and participation
Respond to impact without diagnosing the person who caused it
Stalking exposure may be associated with fear, anxiety, depression, sleep disruption, post-traumatic stress symptoms, somatic complaints, substance-use concerns, suicidal thoughts, missed work or school, financial loss, housing changes, and changes in healthcare use. The presence or absence of one symptom does not prove whether stalking occurred. Likewise, a mental-health diagnosis in any person does not explain or excuse stalking. Organizational training should explicitly reject diagnostic shortcuts about either the person seeking help or the person alleged to have caused harm.
Among 2,064 women entering substance-use-disorder treatment, a 2024 study found that lifetime and especially recent stalking victimization was associated with greater recovery needs and mental-health symptoms at treatment entry; associations with depression and anxiety persisted in the analyses.9 This was a treatment population and the findings are observational. They support asking about safety and practical barriers in recovery settings, not assuming that every patient shares the same history or that stalking caused a particular symptom.
Co-occurring violence can raise complexity. A 2023 analysis of 2010–2012 nationally representative United States survey data examined people who experienced stalking and sexual violence by the same perpetrator. It reported substantial overlap with psychological aggression and physical violence when the same perpetrator was an intimate partner, as well as fear, safety concerns, and post-traumatic-stress symptoms.13 The data period is older, the outcome combines victimization types, and lifetime estimates are not current annual prevalence. The management implication is to avoid siloed workflows that treat stalking, sexual violence, intimate-partner violence, and behavioral health as unrelated when the person’s experience crosses them.
Military and other hierarchical settings can add career, command, housing, confidentiality, and identity concerns. A 2022 respondent-driven sample of 248 active-duty lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender service members linked multiple forms of sexual and stalking victimization with mental-health visits, somatic symptoms, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, and suicidality.15 Because the sample was nonprobability, military-specific, and combined victimization types, it cannot establish general prevalence or cause. It highlights the need for inclusive routes that do not force a person to choose between safety, identity privacy, and professional standing.
Care should address the person’s priorities and presenting needs. That may involve acute medical care, behavioral-health support, medication continuity, sleep or pain care, advocacy, workplace accommodation, leave, transportation, housing, technology support, legal information, or other resources. A mental-health referral should not become a handoff that makes the safety concern disappear. Behavioral-health clinicians need access to the same consultation and referral network as emergency, ambulatory, inpatient, employee-health, and campus teams.
Navigation and coordinated response
Give the route one owner without taking control from the person
Fragmentation creates repeated storytelling, inconsistent advice, uncertain confidentiality, duplicated assessment, and referrals that no one verifies. The solution is not one department absorbing every function. It is one accountable navigator or response lead who can coordinate distinct authorities while preserving the person’s choices and the minimum-necessary information boundary.
A 2022 qualitative evaluation of a multi-agency stalking intervention in three English police forces included 10 victims, three advocates, and 19 stakeholders. Participants described the value of a single-point-of-contact advocate, emotional support, safety planning, navigation, and multi-agency risk assessment.14 The small, potentially selective sample and local context do not prove effectiveness or prescribe a United States healthcare model. They offer a useful design hypothesis: continuity through a trusted advocate can reduce the burden of navigating multiple systems.
A 2025 analysis of the 2019 National Crime Victimization Survey’s stalking supplement found that help-seeking differed by context. People who knew the person who stalked them were more likely to use victim services or personal networks than people stalked by strangers, while the examined variables did not predict police reporting.7 This is a warning against a linear escalation ladder in which every route is judged by whether police become involved. A successful handoff is the support the person chose and the organization could appropriately deliver, not one universal destination.
Figure 3 · Qualitative fishbone
Why a support route becomes unsafe, delayed, or abandoned
Executive agreements should define who may receive a disclosure, who provides urgent consultation, who can conduct specialized risk review, what information may move, when consent is required, what mandatory actions may apply, what happens when a preferred service is full, and who follows up. The response owner should be able to convene privacy, security, clinical, behavioral-health, human-resources, legal, student-affairs, and community partners without disclosing more than necessary.
Capacity is part of safety. If public messaging increases help-seeking but specialized advocates cannot accept a connection, leaders need an interim standard, an escalation route, and transparent queue management. They should not measure campaign success by the number of disclosures. A higher number may reflect increased awareness, increased trust, a change in documentation, increased harm, or multiple factors. Measures should focus on readiness, access, accepted handoffs, safe follow-up, and the person’s experience of respect and choice.
The enterprise operating model
Connect authority around the person, not around the incident log
An enterprise response needs a small governing group with decision rights and a larger network with functional expertise. The governing group should include an executive sponsor, clinical and operational owners, specialized advocacy, workforce or campus representation, security, privacy, legal, digital or information security, quality, and people with lived expertise. It should define the minimum reliable route and allow setting-specific adaptations.
The person seeking help remains at the center. That does not mean every requested action is possible or that every function can remain confidential. It means the organization explains constraints, asks permission when permission is available, shares only what is needed, avoids surprise, and documents disagreements or mandatory actions transparently. When immediate danger or law creates an exception, staff should still preserve voice and dignity to the greatest extent possible.
Figure 4 · Proposed operating-system diagram
Seven interfaces surrounding a person-defined support route
Protect information across the entire route
Sensitive information may appear in an electronic health record, employee file, incident system, security log, learning-management system, email, chat, case-management platform, or personal device. Each system has different access, retention, release, discovery, and notification rules. Leaders should map where a disclosure could be recorded, who can see it, which notifications are automatic, what appears in portals or after-visit documents, and how a person can identify a safe contact method. The goal is not to erase accountability. It is to avoid collecting or distributing detail that the receiving purpose does not require.
A digital-safety response should not depend on a generalist improvising technical instructions. Technology may be part of the conduct, part of the help-seeking route, or both. The organization needs a qualified privacy and security consultation path, plus vetted external expertise when needed. The 2026 study of cyberstalking and wellbeing among 421 participants in Türkiye found complex relationships involving cyberstalking, problematic social-media use, use patterns, and wellbeing.3 Its cross-sectional design cannot establish causal direction. The practical lesson is to avoid reducing the issue to “use social media less” and to address the person’s wider safety, participation, and support needs.
Workforce, student, and volunteer readiness
Train roles to act within scope and connect the next step
Training should be role-specific. Front-desk staff need privacy and escalation skills. Clinicians need supportive inquiry, health response, documentation boundaries, and consultation. Managers need nonretaliation, accommodation, and safe-work coordination. Security staff need pattern-aware intake, survivor-centered communication, and integration with advocacy. Privacy and technology teams need a route for urgent consultation that does not become a do-it-yourself device investigation. Executives need to resolve conflict among policies and provide capacity.
A 2025 mixed-method study of 60 students on one South African university campus found high awareness but low formal reporting and described anger, sleep disruption, headaches, password changes, blocking, and reduced internet use.8 The sample was small, convenience-based, and from one campus, so its percentages should not be generalized. It supports including campus health, student services, academic accommodation, and digital access in response planning.
Scenario practice should include an ambiguous first contact, an intimate-partner context, a stranger context, an employee concern, a patient or visitor concern, technology involvement, an unsafe contact channel, disagreement about reporting, limited advocacy capacity, and a person who does not want a formal action. Evaluation should test whether staff explain limits, consult the right role, preserve choice, avoid blame, complete the handoff, and record only what is necessary. Attendance alone does not establish readiness.
Policies should distinguish support from investigation. A clinician or manager may need to preserve immediate safety, document a report, or notify another function, but should not represent themselves as a specialized threat assessor or legal advisor. Staff also need support when the person alleged to be causing harm is a colleague, clinician, patient, leader, family member, or community partner. Power and conflicts of interest must have explicit escalation routes.
Organizational response should include the workforce member who receives a difficult disclosure. Debriefing, supervision, and expert consultation can reduce improvisation and secondary stress. The debrief should focus on process and support, not circulate identifying detail unnecessarily. Recurring uncertainty is a system signal: update the job aid, policy, training scenario, or referral agreement rather than expecting each employee to remember an exception.
Measurement and privacy safeguards
Measure readiness and completed support, not disclosure volume
A useful dashboard begins with operational definitions. What counts as a private access opportunity? What makes a handoff accepted? What is the locally approved urgent-consultation interval? What constitutes a safe-contact plan? Which cases can be reviewed in aggregate without identifying a person? Every measure needs a numerator, denominator, exclusions, owner, cadence, equity view, privacy rule, balancing measure, and action threshold.
Higher disclosure counts are ambiguous. They may indicate greater trust, better recognition, changing documentation, greater exposure, or a combination. Lower counts are equally ambiguous. Do not rank departments by disclosure volume or set quotas. Use protected case review to understand whether the route worked, where it failed, and whether a policy, capacity, communication, or training change is needed.
Figure 5 · Structured measurement table
Candidate management measures for a locally governed response
| Domain | Candidate operational definition | Denominator | Owner and cadence | Equity or access view | Privacy safeguard or balancing measure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Private access | Eligible encounters with a documented safe opportunity to speak privately under the approved workflow, percentage | Encounters meeting the local eligibility rule | Clinical or workforce operations, monthly sample | Site, language, disability access, care modality, workforce status | Documentation does not prove that the channel was safe or that disclosure was expected |
| Response readiness | Applicable staff who pass a role-specific scenario covering privacy limits, supportive response, consultation, and handoff, percentage | Staff assigned to each defined role | Education and functional owner, quarterly | Role, shift, site, employment type | A scenario cannot establish performance in every case; avoid collecting personal histories |
| Consultation access | Requests for designated expert consultation receiving acknowledgment within the locally defined interval, percentage | Eligible consultation requests | Response program owner, monthly | Entry point, shift, location, request type | Do not publish small cells or compare urgency categories without adjustment |
| Accepted handoff | Chosen support connections explicitly accepted by the receiving service with the information boundary recorded, percentage | Connections the person chose and authorized when authorization applies | Navigator or advocacy owner, monthly | Service type, language, geography, digital or physical access | Acceptance is not proof of benefit; nonacceptance may reflect capacity rather than individual choice |
| Safe follow-up | Eligible cases with an agreed channel, time, wording, owner, and escalation path documented, percentage | Cases requiring follow-up under local policy | Case owner, weekly review | Channel, digital access, language, disability accommodation | Minimize detail and audit automated messages that may reveal sensitive information |
| Person experience | Protected feedback reporting respect, choice, clarity, privacy, and knowledge of the next step, percentage and count | Voluntary respondents using the safe feedback route | Experience and advocacy leads, quarterly | Analyze only when privacy-protective and statistically defensible | Nonresponse may reflect risk or mistrust; never contact someone through an unconfirmed channel |
| Capacity and learning | Recurring route failures with an owner, due date, completed action, and post-change review, percentage | Failures accepted into the protected improvement log | Executive sponsor and quality, monthly | Entry point, service gap, time, geography where safe | Action closure does not prove effectiveness; track unintended exposure or delay |
Case review should use the minimum information necessary. Small cells, unusual scenarios, named locations, timestamps, and combinations of characteristics can identify someone even when a name is removed. A dashboard may need to suppress counts, aggregate periods, or report themes rather than rows. People with lived expertise should help define which information is safe to collect and which measures feel coercive or misleading.
Balance speed with autonomy. A short consultation interval may be important, but a measure that rewards rapid closure could pressure a person into a service or formal action. Track both accepted handoff and whether the person reported respect and choice. Track urgent access and unintended exposure. Track training completion and scenario performance. Track referral availability and the time a receiving service needs to accept. A balanced set makes system tradeoffs visible.
A focused implementation agenda
Use 90 days to build, test, and correct the route
A 90-day effort should begin with safety boundaries and lived-experience input, not a campaign launch. The first month maps reality and assigns authority. The second month tests the route under different contexts. The third month pilots with protected measurement and corrects defects before broader communication. Activities can overlap when the organization has the capacity to manage them safely.
Figure 6 · Proposed Gantt-style timeline
A 30/60/90-day route-building sequence
Text alternative
Days 1–30 establish governance, listen, map entry points, review privacy and technology, define competencies, and approve measures. Days 31–60 resolve conflicts, co-design the workflow, test consultation and handoffs, simulate unsafe channels, train staff, and baseline readiness. Days 61–90 pilot one setting, correct defects, coach staff, monitor unintended effects, and review results before expanding communication.
Days 1 to 30: set the safety standard
Name the sponsor and operational owner. Convene advocates, clinicians, behavioral health, workforce or campus leaders, security, privacy, legal, digital, quality, and lived-experience advisors. Map every entry point, record, message, handoff, mandatory action, and resource. Verify current local victim services and urgent consultation. Define what staff should do when they cannot obtain a preferred service. Approve a minimum-necessary documentation standard and a safe-contact protocol.
Days 31 to 60: simulate real friction
Train by role and test scenarios. Include a person who does not use the word stalking, a concern involving a colleague, limited external capacity, technology involvement, an unsafe portal, different jurisdictional duties, and a person who declines formal reporting. Observe whether the response preserves choice, explains limits, reaches expertise, and completes an accepted handoff. Correct policies and tools after each simulation.
Days 61 to 90: pilot and learn safely
Pilot in one setting with accessible expert backup. Review each handoff and near miss through a protected process. Collect voluntary feedback through a confirmed safe channel. Monitor capacity, delay, unintended disclosure, respect, and choice. Expand only after leaders can show that the route is available, understood, and correctable. January should leave behind durable capability, not only awareness materials.
Executive action. Ask one accountable leader to demonstrate the route from a private first contact to an accepted support connection, then fund and assign every correction needed to make that route reliable.
Peer-reviewed evidence
References
The evidence base includes systematic, survey, qualitative, participatory, and observational studies from different countries and populations. Findings are applied only within the limitations stated in the article. References are ordered newest first.
- Weekes CJ, Storey JE, Pina A. (2026). Cyberstalking perpetrators and their methods: A systematic literature review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 27(3), 1009–1025. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380251333411
- Macharia JN, Kiilu J, Odiwuor S, et al. (2026). Navigating technology-facilitated abuse: A participatory action research study with young adults living with HIV and key populations in Kenya. PLoS Global Public Health, 6(8), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0007060
- Göçet-Tekin E, Taş İ, Özsoy E, Griffiths MD. (2026). Cyberstalking and well-being: Mediating and moderating roles of problematic social media use and use patterns. Australian Psychologist, 61(4), 377–389. https://doi.org/10.1080/00050067.2026.2636263
- Enock FE, Stevens F, Sippy T, et al. (2026). Gendered inequalities in online harms: Fear, safety work, and online participation. Computers in Human Behavior, 181, 108990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2026.108990
- Cho S, Lee CS. (2026). A typology of stalking victims’ nonreporting justifications: Objective measures related to help-seeking behavior. Violence Against Women, 32(6–7), 1941–1965. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012251347604
- Sheridan-Johnson J, Mumford EA, Moschella-Smith EA, Maitra P, Rein DB, Rothman EF. (2025). Economic impacts of technology-facilitated abuse among U.S. young adults. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 40(21–22), 5285–5311. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605241305146
- Wengloski CE, Cleary HMD. (2025). Help-seeking from victim services, personal networks, and reporting to police: Stalking victim behaviors from the 2019 NCVS Supplemental Victimization Survey. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 40(15–16), 3526–3547. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605241268773
- Lukose JM, Agbeyangi AO. (2025). The rising threat of cyberstalking: Awareness and coping mechanisms among higher education students. Digital Culture & Education, 16(1), 61–77.
- Logan TK, Cole J. (2024). Mental health and recovery needs among women substance use disorder treatment clients with stalking victimization experiences. Journal of Drug Issues, 54(2), 218–237. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220426231159307
- Johnson ID, LaPlante JE. (2024). Labeling victimization experiences and self as predictors of service need perceptions and talking to police. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 39(5–6), 949–972. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605231199109
- Brady PQ, Reyns BW. (2024). The focal concerns of stalking victims: Examining victims’ decisions to engage civil and criminal legal systems. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 51(8), 1181–1203. https://doi.org/10.1177/00938548241238344
- Suzuki T. (2024). A survey on the reasons why victims of stalking did not exhibit help-seeking behavior: A text-mining analysis. BMC Psychology, 12(1), 515. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-024-02035-7
- Basile KC, Smith SG, Wang J, Friar N. (2023). Characteristics and impacts of sexual violence and stalking victimization by the same perpetrator using a nationally representative sample. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 32(9), 1271–1284. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926771.2022.2133660
- Jerath K, Tompson L, Belur J. (2022). Risk management in stalking victims: A multi-agency approach to victim advocacy. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(11–12), NP8989–NP9015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520980402
- Klemmer CL, Schuyler AC, Mamey MR, et al. (2022). Health and service-related impact of sexual and stalking victimization during United States military service on LGBT service members. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(9–10), NP7554–NP7579. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520970312
